

THE DILEMMA OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN DEVELOPMENT MODELS: A CASE STUDY FROM ADDIS ABABA

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ABSTRACT

Africa is experiencing rapid urbanization in extreme poverty. The overwhelming problems of its large and growing cities are a particular challenge for urban governance. In this situation the West no longer offers the only role model for development to African countries as some East Asian states have risen from third world to first within the last generation. Today, urban governance in African megacities is in a dilemma of having to decide between a participatory model of input-legitimacy promulgated by Western donors and a paternalistic, authoritarian model of output-legitimacy followed by Eastern agencies. These two models exert conflicting pressures, e.g. in Addis Ababa. This paper studies three selected urban governance programs: The revision of the Masterplan, the City Charter, the Grand Housing Program. It examines how urban governance in Addis Ababa balances this dilemma for better or worse – a situation that is characteristic for African metropolis in this international era.

Keywords: Africa, Urbanisation, Urban Governance, Addis Ababa, Development Models

Part 1 - Introduction

In this urban age large cities are developing in Africa, too. Currently, the world's poorest continent is experiencing the fastest urban growth. However, urbanization in poverty is a process unparalleled in history. Steering the rapid development of these increasingly large, heterogeneous and complex cities presents an unprecedented challenge for societies where so few financial, technical and political capacities are found. In this situation of overwhelming growth, external models and support for urban governance are being sought.

Yet, in this global age the West no longer offers the only role model for development to African countries as some East Asian states have risen 'from third world to first' (Lee Kuan Yew, 2000) within the last generation. The

former North-South relation of development aid has changed to a new chapter of East vs. West in the South. As in the times of colonialism and cold war, Africa is once again a stage for a global competition between systems. "When China wakes, the world will tremble" says a famous dictum from Napoleon. It is now in the seemingly remote continent of Africa and particularly in its cities that the waves of this global quake can be sensed most strongly.

African cities are facing a political dilemma, as urban centers are often simultaneously the focus of attempts for economic development and societal advancement. Today, urban governance in African cities is in a dilemma of having to decide between a participatory, good governance model of input-legitimacy promulgated by Western donors and a paternalistic, authoritarian model of output-legitimacy followed by Eastern agencies (Bache & Flinders, 2005). While the Eastern model professes that democratization is the end product of development, the Western model sees democratization as its basis. It is in African cities that the unresolved issue between democratization and development is being fought out. The two models of development and the conflicts between them reflect on urban governance, for example in Addis Ababa, a case that will be studied in detail in this paper.

The first chapter looks at the theory and history of the western and eastern development models. The second chapter examines the case of Addis Ababa, especially the development of the last decade, where a significant policy change from a western to an eastern model of development can be detected. It will focus on the conceptualisation and implementation of three selected urban programs: the revision of the Addis Ababa Masterplan, the Addis Ababa City Charter and the Addis Ababa Grand Housing Program. Finally, it will conclude on the dilemma between speed and sustainability in the recent development of this African 'megacity in the making' (Mai, 2006).

Part 2a - Theoretical Framework: Input Legitimacy versus Output Legitimacy

Western Model

Western systems of governance are based on democratic principles and derive their strength from what is called 'input legitimacy' or the legitimacy gained by a government from its democratic bases such as participation, individual rights and transparency. The resulting practice of urban governance in western countries and subsequently as promoted by western donor agencies is therefore based on principles such as norms and values, accountability, participation,

monitoring and decentralisation (Van Dijk, 2006). '(Governance) denotes that there may be more than one actor involved. For cities and particularly megacities characterised by social and spatial fragmentation and economic pressure the issue of governance becomes even more critical, raising questions associated with legitimacy, social exclusion, access to resources and political power.' (Inwent, 2007). Reforming urban governance therefore means improving consultative mechanisms, strengthening local democracy, implementing inclusive social policies and so on. As cities are the foci of national economic development, the presumption or prescription is that economic reforms and democratic reforms should go hand in hand.

Eastern Model

The East Asian top-down approach to governance in general and urban governance in particular is based on the 'output-legitimacy' of government – i.e. performance-oriented criteria largely based on delivering visible results. In these paternalistic or authoritarian systems, the number of actors taking part in governance may be limited to the government and perhaps the more powerful elements of the private sector. This is the governance model associated with the political culture of many East Asian 'Tiger States' with economic success stories such as Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and most recently China. (Peerenboom, 2007) The characteristics of the resulting urban management in China for example, is that it is top-down, government-led - which means that higher levels of government stipulate urban policy, sectoral rather than integrated, lacking in consultation and participation, focusing on economic development, and with a focus on prestige projects. (Van Dijk, 2006). It also rests on a reinterpretation of input legitimacy on the basis of special 'Asian' values justifying the government's expert and benign position to act in the interests of the people (Chua Beng-Huat, 1995).

The Dilemma

The western experience was itself however different from its own prescriptions, where rapid urban and economic growth did not take place under the democratic systems of today but rather under technocratic and top-down models of planning during the 19th century and industrial revolution. In a similar process, the east Asian countries have developed their economies and their cities under authoritarian systems. Indeed authoritarian governance is deemed as necessary to maintain political stability, without which economic development is not possible. In the last 30 years, 500 million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty (Langhammer, 2008). Having one decision-making centre and authority

enabled the efficient and prompt implementation of policies without subjecting them to long discussions and consultations (Deng Xiao Ping in Seitz, 2006). In the eastern view, rapid and sometimes painful economic transition cannot take place under conditions of democracy, instead, democracy is an end-product of economic development.

There is thus an inherent tension in the western prescription of market-oriented reforms to be accompanied by democratic reforms. This tension is recognised by the leaders of many African countries. The East Asian 'output legitimacy' model is finding a receptive audience among the ruling African elite and specifically in the case of Ethiopia, (Peerenboom, 2007) where it also finds a better fit with the political culture. Among the higher level Ethiopian bureaucrats and politicians, there is a positive attitude towards and admiration of China. Moreover, in what is considered a fundamental shift from its previous economic convictions, recently UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development) has recommended African states to practice the east Asian 'developmental state' concept based on state-led economic development and interventionism (Chebud Michael, 2007). In recent intensified bilateral exchanges, China and Ethiopia have been described as having a history of facing 'similar developmental challenges' (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007). As Ethiopia has increasingly moved towards a 'developmental state' approach as advocated by its Prime Minister Menes Zenawi in numerous speeches and writings, its current governance can be described as one in which 'economic development is prioritised above political freedoms and democracy' (ibid).

The question is thus which model facing the African countries is credible and what is appropriate for their economic development and urban management, and what are the consequences of their choice?

Part 2b - History of Western and Eastern Engagement in Africa and Ethiopia

Africa has been a stage for competition between external models since the colonial era. From 1600 onwards, it was the scene of rivalry between various European powers, especially France and England. After independence and during the cold war, it was a stage for competition between the capitalist west and the communist east. It continues to be a stage for rivalry – between the West and the new emerging power of China. After a period of neglect, Africa has regained importance in the struggle for resources, strategic influence and commercial advantage.

Western Development Engagement in Africa

The relationship of European countries with Africa is very much contextualised by their colonial past, while for the United States it is their policy towards the continent during the cold war. In the post-independence period the policy of western countries towards Africa could be described variously as ranging from paternalistic (SAP - Structural Adjustment Programmes, neo-liberal Washington Consensus etc) to neglectful and even pessimistic. With regards to urban governance, there was for a long time more effort going towards rural development and a neglect of the cities. Now however cities are in the focus of western development and donor activity as urbanisation and urban poverty are universally acknowledged to be defining factors of growth in the South in terms of economics, demographics and the environment. Over the past two decades, western development engagement has evolved from highly interventionist SAP-led assistance, in which aid was tied to conditionality of western-determined reforms to a partnership-based approach within the framework of the Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008). There has thus been a paradigm shift from donor-dominated donation to one of local ownership and capacity building. More significantly, there is a switch from prescriptive conditions about how and when aid money is spent to conditions based on the developing country's own development objectives (www.oecd.org). Thus the western approach of for example tying aid to 'good governance' conditionality, which was felt to be too interfering, is being relaxed for better or for worse.

The West in Ethiopia

Almost all western countries have had diplomatic relations with Ethiopia since the early 20th century, as it was the only independent African state at the time (apart from the special case of Liberia). Today Ethiopia continues to be a strategic country for the West, as the only Christian country in the Horn of Africa. Urban governance reform is a focal point of western donor organisations, as Ethiopia is currently facing a very high rate of urbanisation of 6% and continued population growth. Urban governance reform in Ethiopia is officially based on an 'Urban Good Governance Package', a standardized orientation document for local governments around the country to adopt and internalise. It was prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Works and Urban Development with input from the World Bank & UN Habitat. Reform is based on principles of good urban governance such as : Ensuring Sustainability of Urban Development, Subsidiarity, Ensuring Equity with regard to Resource Utilization, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Service Delivery, Transparency and

Accountability, Participation and Consensus Building and Ensuring Rule of Law and Security (MoWUD, 2006).

The western 'input legitimacy' model has normative value and is accepted on that basis by the political leadership. However, with a shift away from conditionality in western aid, the democratic philosophy of their new approach and the developmental state policies pursued by African countries, ironically western donors may increasingly have to ally themselves with non-democratic approaches to urban management and governance.

Chinese Development Engagement in Africa

In the 1950s China began to establish relations with African countries in a effort to break the international isolation it was facing in the post-war era. Since the 1960s Sino-African relations have been based on 'Five Principles' elaborated by then Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai, which include among other things ideas such as opposition to imperialism and neo-colonialism and supporting self-chosen paths to unity and unification. It is clear that these principles were based on their conscious differentiation from apparent western policy and past with regard to Africa, in terms of colonialism and emphasis on democratic systems (Abraham, 2005). During the cold war, China exercised 'soft' power in Africa through non-conditionality of aid, non-interference in internal affairs and an insistence on the adoption of a one-China policy. Similar principles continue to define relations and have been re-emphasised under the auspices of the 'Forum on China-Africa Co-operation' established in 2000. The establishment of the high level forum is promoted as a co-operation between developing countries or 'South-South' co-operation, a 'new-type' of co-operation based on equality, with a clear undertone of differentiating it from the 'unequal' relationship that Africa has with the West. The defining features of this relationship are: non-interference in domestic political affairs, respect for political sovereignty, opposition to the politicisation of human rights and of human rights conditionalities and Chinese participation in engineering infrastructure construction and development projects in African countries (ibid). Overall, Chinese engagement in Africa can be described as being strongly based on furthering Chinese economic interests. China provides massive aid to African countries in exchange for access to natural resources and raw materials and without any political conditionality tied to their assistance. This approach naturally gives corrupt and dictatorial regimes an alternative to accepting western aid, which may be tied to some conditions of governance reforms (Asia News Agencies, 2006).

China in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a focus country for China on account of it being politically strategic, rather than resource-rich. However, Ethiopia's agricultural exports to China have been growing exponentially over the past ten years although China enjoys a big trade surplus. Payment for exports from Ethiopia to China are now channeled through one bank – the National Bank of Ethiopia – representing a shift to what is known as 'The Angola Model' whereby African commodities are exchanged for Chinese loan money (Davies Martin, 2008).

Chinese firms began to be active in the Ethiopian context through the construction of the Addis Ababa 'Ring Road', which they won through a competitive tender. Today, Chinese firms are building most of the city's ambitious road network and control 50-60% of the road-construction sector in Ethiopia. They are also involved in building a Chinese-style 'Special Economic Zone' close to Addis Ababa in Dukem.

Chinese overseas investment capital is currently the largest pool in the world and the Chinese have been responsive to Africa's needs focusing their aid on infrastructure provision. This together with their own success story and lack of conditionality in aid make them the ideal role model for African development. Since the western model of good governance and the rule of law is highly correlated with wealthier societies rather than societies in the early stage of development (Peerenboom, 2007).

This approach is justified by the leadership as a logical and necessary path for Ethiopia to take.

Part 3 - Case Studies

Historic Background

Addis Ababa was founded in 1886 as the capital of the geographically and ethnically diverse Ethiopian empire. As Ethiopia was the only African country that was not colonized its capital was built on an indigenous settlement structure. The urban fabric reflected the social patterns of the feudal society of Ethiopia. The regional rulers (ras) would reside in the midst of their people's settlements (sefers) around the imperial palace (ghebbi). In contrast to colonial cities where Western powers built up infrastructure but also left a fatal heritage of social and spatial segregation, Addis Ababa had a strong social 'mixture' but struggled with a severe lack of infrastructure. Throughout its first century the

city was never modernized beyond some isolated areas due to constant economic and ideological limitations of the ruling powers, be it feudal or socialist. In 1991 after almost two decades of civil war the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Defence Force (EPRDF) came to power. Since then, the governance systems of state, regions and cities were reformed and the command economy of the former Derg-regime was abandoned in favour of a more market-oriented system without, however, privatizing land ownership. Only after the end of the three year war with Eritrea in 2000 did a period of economic progress set in. Ethiopia reports official figures of 10% economic growth and at first sight Addis Ababa seems to be a boomtown with massive construction of new mid- and high-rise buildings everywhere. Yet, despite this promising development the situation of the large part of the people remains precarious.

Current Situation

Addis Ababa is the largest city in one of Africa's least urbanized and poorest economies. Its regional position is both very remote and primate, which are rather unfavourable conditions for economic growth as synergies between cities can hardly be achieved (World Bank, 2005b). Over decades Addis Ababa's urban versus economic growth has been highly disproportionate. Apparently, the gap was so large that no other city in history was simultaneously so large and so poor at any point in its development (ibid).

Some statistics illustrate the current situation:

- 80% of the city's dwellings fall under UN-Habitat's definition of slum (overcrowding, poor or informal housing, inadequate access to water and sanitation, insecurity of tenure), meaning that any attempt for up-grading or renewal more or less concerns the whole city (UN Habitat: The Challenge of Slums, 2003 in Davis, 2006).
- 40% of citizens of Addis Ababa live on 8% of the built-up area (ETH MAS UTDT 2006-07).
- 30% of the households live in one-room accomodation, resulting in an extreme density (ibid).
- 1.3% of the population is connected to modern sanitation. (Addis Ababa City Government, 2002)
- 50% of the households earn less than 600 birr (approx. 60-70 US\$ / 40 EUR) per month, meaning that any attempt of providing affordable servives such as housing or infrastructure have to consider the marginal sums that can be spared and invested (World Bank, 2005a).

- 20% or more inflation and rising food prices means that even less money is available for housing, education, transport, medical treatment, etc (Davis, 2006).
- 75% of the citizens cannot afford public transport and have to walk, meaning that equity of infrastructure provision would mean catering to their needs first and keeping them located close to their employment opportunities (Addis Ababa City Government, 2000).
- 6% urban growth rate meaning an increase from 4 million inhabitants in 2005 to 12 million in 2025 (Berrisford: UN Urbanisation Prospects, 2001 in WB 2005a).

With such a scenario, the prospects of Addis Ababa are very much related to the question of urban governance and which model of development is being followed.

Three Programs of Urban Governance in Addis Ababa

In the past decade, three programs of urban governance have been the focus of the city's policy for development.

A. The Structure Plan

By the late 1990s with the establishment of a new political system and continuous growth of the city it became obvious that Addis Ababa needed new guidelines for its future urban development. The Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Masterplan (ORAAMP) set up in 1999, was mainly consulted by the German GTZ and the Town Planning Agency of Greater Lyon, France. ORAAMP acted as an independent agency outside of the vertical structure of the city government, therefore being able 'to develop an integrated and holistic urban planning process that plays a decisive role in solving the city's problems.' (ORAAMP, 2002). The intended revision actually led to a completely new conceptual approach and instead of a Masterplan the outcome was a Structure Plan. The difference is that a Structure Plan "provides a vision and determines strategic axes for urban development. It deals with the 'big picture' and leaves most of the individual activities 'unplanned' - or to be planned in more detail through participatory action plans (Local Development Plans) when the time is ripe for a specific area to be developed." (Matewos Asfaw, general manager of ORAAMP, in: Addis Ababa City Government, 2000) In short, the role of the government shifted from being the *only actor* toward that of a *facilitator* for urban development.

Along this line, ORAAMP started its work with an unprecedented participatory event, the City Forum, held in 2000 under the theme of "Bringing the Urban Development Agenda into Public Debate" (Addis Ababa City Government, 2000). During one month more than 50,000 citizens took part in public fora prioritizing urban issues, developing a shared vision, disseminating information and identifying key stakeholders. Following this event ORAAMP's activities focussed on more specialized fields, e.g. market hierarchy, green frame, investment plans, waste management, traffic planning, trying to involve stakeholders and introducing so called Strategic Action Plans which attempted to keep feasibility and implementation in close view. In total over 150 consultative meetings, workshops, exhibitions and fora were held and the final output was presented to the public in a concluding conference in August 2002. Subsequently, ORAAMP, being an externalized agency of the city-planning department, was reintegrated into the city government. The following reform of the city's administrative structure (see next chapter) decentralized the issue of city planning. Through this, structural city planning, unfortunately, lost its power just at the moment when the Structure Plan was ready. Nevertheless, the Structure Plan is the only referential document in the process of city planning in Addis until today.

Referring to the theoretical framework established in this paper it can be said that the process of revising urban planning in Addis Ababa had a very Western influenced vision of how a city is best run and very clear features of the Western model of participatory planning. It laid a strong emphasis on *input legitimacy* and integration.

However, over time there has been limited commitment on the part of the government to allow for a participatory process of forming the 'Local Development Plans'. Moreover, much of the resettlement that has taken place due to development plans was not conducted in a consultative, transparent and just manner. The City Administration has also not proven to be very willing to work with the broader private sector and non-governmental actors. Due to the de facto monopoly of the city government on developing large housing estates the idea of multiple actors in city planning has been made redundant. Today, the promise to *input-legitimacy* of the planning process envisioned in the Structure Plan is in reality sidelined by the hoped for *out-put legitimacy* to be gained from delivering large housing estates and commercial buildings quickly.

B. The City Charter

In 2003 the City of Addis Ababa received a new constitution or 'City Charter', which officially began the administrative reform process (Mai, 2005). The core of the reform was the formation of 10 sub-cities and the devolution of power from city level to these decentralized units of governance. So-called 'One-Stop-Shops' were supposed to disentangle the maze of bureaucracy and provide a number of local services to residents. A 'Community Based Neighbourhood Development Programme' intended to let citizens have a greater say over their own political and developmental priorities on a participatory basis. The introduction of a decentralised constitution was accompanied by an administrative modernisation involving a rotation of personnel, stricter recruitment criteria, flatter organisations, customer orientation, greater decision-making on lower levels, shorter processing times and outsourcing of some previously government functions like public parking management, driving schools and garbage collection. This administrative modernisation has been fairly successful. On the whole day to day running of city administration and citizen's affairs has noticeably improved. The new City-Charter is in keeping with principles of 'Good Urban Governance'. The combination of *input legitimacy* (devolution of power) and *output-legitimacy* (improvement of service) progressed well.

The fact that the 2005 election was denied and that there was a caretaker government and now once again an EPRDF led city government shows that somehow the truly decentralised and democratic charter has not really been allowed to function (ibid). Today, Addis has for the first time in its history an elected mayor. The elections however, were a non-event due to remaining disillusionment on account of the rigged 2005 elections.

Today's political reality overshadows the reform efforts of the past decade. The city administration is currently undergoing a process of so-called Business Process Reengineering (BPR). What looks like a technocratic process is actually an attempt to streamline the urban governance on a one-party system and to strengthen the hand of the ruling party. The new Mayor's administration "has already injected between 4,000 and 5,000 new staff into its various agencies. The majority of these have shown commitment to their party and attended the month long training on government policies and programmes" (Zenebe, 2009). Furthermore, "In the area of human resources, the EPRDF-led administration decided that it should recruit new graduates and new employees with commitment to party ideals" (ibid).

Hence, the nature of decentralisation has been administrative rather than political which limits its effectiveness. A large section of the population which has been empowered de jure due to governance reforms is de facto disenfranchised.

C. The Addis Ababa Grand Housing Programme

With 80% of Addis Ababa's houses in deteriorated condition and an ever-increasing number of new inhabitants, the question of housing is a massive challenge of quality as well as of quantity. Since the late 1990s a number of approaches for housing concepts were developed and tested in small-scale pilot projects by NGOs and bilateral donor projects. The Structure Plan proposed a differentiated strategy for housing. On the one hand it recommended to "involve the private sector in the development and supply of cleared and serviced land" in order to increase the number of new housing projects and on the other hand to "privatize kebele housing" (Kebele is the lowest sub-city administrative unit) in order to overcome the stagnation in the possible tenant-led upgrading of the more and more small-scale deteriorating housing stock owned by the public sector (Executive Summary in: Addis Ababa City Government, 2002). It also opted to "permit self-help housing with only minimal building standards; foster the use of indigenous, low-cost construction materials and technology and give developed plots to low-income population at subsidized rates; and support the construction of low-income private rental housing" (Addis Ababa City Government, 2001).

This urban governance policy based on the idealistic assumption of a free-market economy and a civil society was soon replaced by a new policy that has to be seen in perspective with the federal government's attempt at a 'great leap forward' towards a state-led industrialization in Ethiopia. In an integrated economic policy approach a state-led housing policy was seen as a generator for development of the society as a whole, promoting first steps in industrialization through the introduction of new low-cost technologies and creating massive employment through labour intensive production processes. Priority was given to technological and political aspects rather than social or cultural dimensions of the city and its inhabitants. Furthermore, instead of privatizing kebele houses, stimulating private initiatives and developing new housing projects through the private sector as suggested in the Structure Plan and its Strategic Action Plans, all areas of housing policy remained under control of the state. In contrast to the governance models favoured by the Structure Plan, the state once again was or rather remained the only actor in urban development in order to control land ownership, construction materials, companies and the distribution of housing.

In 2004 the "Addis Ababa Grand Housing Programme" was launched and the Addis Ababa Housing Development Program Office (AAHDPO) was formed as an agency to run it. One of Africa's largest public housing programmes aimed in its first Five Year Plan to build 150.000 - 200.000 new housing units in Addis Ababa and thereby create 60.000 new jobs and 2.000 new micro and small enterprises in the construction sector. That year one sixth of the total Addis Ababa annual budget went into the new housing scheme (World Bank, 2005a). Five years into the programme, AAHDPO has reached most of its ambitious quantitative goals, even though the number of units built is somehow behind plan. Employment is being created and technological progress made, however, the quality of construction is found wanting and it is questionable how the small and medium enterprises created can be sustained beyond the duration of the program. Large technological and administrative problems appear in maintenance and facility management. New residents have difficulties adapting their culture of living to the multi-storeyed apartment blocks with floor plans shaped for the lifestyle of a modern urban family. And it is a massive political problem that the low-cost housing program that consumed such a large part of the city's assets and investments has not served the lowest-income groups, which are the vast majority of households in Addis Ababa.

Western donor agencies had predicted these problems of sustainability and social balance and had criticized the one-size-fits-all strategy and the "opt for visible, quick-fix approaches to address the housing crisis." (ibid). Yet the then Mayor of Addis Ababa, Arkebe Qubay, tellingly summed up the project's scope - leaving out the social aspect of housing the poor and instead emphasizing visible aspects of city beautification: "Old houses will be demolished and new houses will be built in selected pockets to *embellish the appearance* of the city. They will be replaced by apartments of three and four storeys that could fit the *status of Addis Ababa* (emphasis added)." (The Mayor of Addis Ababa, Arkebe Qubay, Fortune July 18 in ibid). Housing has become a technology driven, prestige oriented, mega-sized project serving the middle class and leaving the poor in need of basic housing. This is quite the opposite of where the first attempts to solve the housing crisis in Addis had started a decade earlier. The question of housing in Addis Ababa has turned from participation to paternalism with the common citizen unable to steer his own fate. Size and speed have been given priority over sustainability. In order to cope with the overwhelming dynamics of the program a group of Chinese planners were hired to contribute to the planning efforts of the program. The Addis Ababa Grand Housing Program has all the characteristics of an output-legitimacy oriented urban governance model as often found in China or East Asia.

4. Conclusion

Urbanisation in poverty, as experienced in Addis Ababa like in many other African cities is an unprecedented phenomenon. The current western model of urban governance was not in place when the West experienced rapid urban and economic growth in the 19th century industrial revolution. It therefore lacks credibility as a model for African cities to follow today. Yet it is imported because it comes with donor money and lipservice is paid to its values. On the other hand, African governments now have an alternative in China and might as well choose a programme of aid that comes without conditionality.

The western model obviously meets the complexity demands of a metropolis but as it produces slow and incremental change is likely to be abandoned for quicker and more visible results. The eastern model manages the metropolitan challenges of size and speed but as it is likely to be one-sided and sectoral it lacks sustainability. The danger of the eastern model however is that purely state-driven development programmes may be used as instruments of securing political power and stifling opposition. A lack of pluralism also increases the risk of failure of large-scale government programmes and failure caused by unqualified party-appointed technocrats.

Urban governance in Addis Ababa and other African cities is in a dilemma between these two models.

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